IRANIANS, VENEZUELANS OVERSEAS FAVOR CHANGE; HOME MOOD DIFFERS

As protest and military action raised the prospect of regime change in Iran and Venezuela, the voices of both countries’ diasporas were heard loud and clear through the media of their host nations.

Venezuelan exiles in the U.S. were, according to the popular narrative, broadly behind President Donald Trump and his plan to “run Venezuela,” as the nickname “MAGAzuelans” suggests. Meanwhile, the Iranian diaspora rallied behind Prince Reza Pahlavi as he positioned himself as a leader-in-waiting, projecting an image of unified exile support.

Diasporas are often treated by media and policymakers as monolithic blocs — politically unified, ideologically coherent, and ready to be mobilized for regime change. But as a scholar of migration and security in Latin America, I know this assumption fundamentally misunderstands how diaspora communities form, evolve, and engage politically.

Iranian and Venezuelan émigrés might broadly oppose their current governments, having left them; this is unsurprising. But they are far from unified on what should replace those governments, who should lead, or how change should come about.

MIGRATION WAVES SHAPE POLITICS

Diasporas are not uniform because their constituent populations did not arrive all at once, from the same places, or for the same reasons. Each migration wave carries distinct political orientations shaped by the circumstances of departure.

Consider the Turkish diaspora in Europe. It has a reputation for religious conservatism and nationalism, favoring the ruling party of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan — seemingly paradoxical given that most live in liberal democracies and support center-left parties in their host countries.

The explanation lies in history, as diaspora scholar Eva Østergaard-Nielsen has detailed. Turkish migration to Europe came in successive waves, each marginalized by Turkey’s longtime secular establishment that dominated the country’s politics until the rise of Erdoğan in the early 2000s. Religious conservatives fled discrimination, Kurds fled persecution, and later came economic migrants. Erdoğan’s ruling AKP has capitalized on this with active outreach to these established diaspora communities. Only recently have people fleeing the AKP government begun gaining a foothold in the diaspora. In a working paper, Gülcan Sağlam and I find sentiment toward Turkey’s ruling party is not predicted by demographics, nor offset by integration or support for liberal EU parties. Instead, diaspora politics are shaped by personal beliefs and perceived discrimination.

The Turkish experience also speaks to the tendency of diasporas to become politically frozen at the moment of departure from their home countries. The same pattern appears across contexts. For example, El Salvador’s diaspora in the United States, which first left during the 1980s civil war, developed a reputation for being “stuck in the ‘80s”, mentally still fighting battles that had long since ended at home. Temporal distance shapes diaspora politics. IranianAmerican sociologist Asef Bayat argues exile opposition can suffer a “political disease,” positioning itself against the very movements it claims to support. Diaspora activists may adopt stances that appeal to Western audiences but carry little backing among people living under authoritarian rule, creating tension with those they seek to represent. Research on Venezuelans shows a similar pattern: a 2022 study found exiles hold more extreme anti-govt views than citizens who stayed.

THE MYTH OF DIASPORA INFLUENCE

Despite fears of diaspora disconnection, homeland politicians devote outsized attention to emigrants because remittances can reach 25% of GDP in some Central American and Caribbean states. Leaders assume this financial power converts into political influence over relatives. An El Salvador official put it bluntly: one supporter in Washington equals five votes at home. My research finds this exaggerated: remittances mostly reinforce existing partisan ties rather than change votes. Yet belief in diaspora power matters. In his unconstitutional 2024 reelection, Nayib Bukele expanded online external voting, boosting diaspora ballots 87-fold & channeling them to San Salvador, overwhelming oppn.

DIASPORAS IN OPPOSITION

When diasporas oppose authoritarian rule, the record is mixed. They can shape politics through voting, funding opposition, lobbying host governments and spreading democratic norms via Peggy Levitt’s “social remittances.” Some research finds remittances can weaken dictatorships by sustaining opposition activity. But authoritarian states have built countermeasures. Studies of Arab diaspora activism show regimes using transnational repression to deter dissent. Freedom House recorded more than 1,200 incidents of physical transnational repression — including assassinations, abductions, assaults and unlawful deportations — by 48 governments between 2014 and 2024.

THE LIMITS OF EXILE POLITICS

For Venezuela and Iran, these lessons counsel caution. Nearly 8 million Venezuelans have fled, the Western Hemisphere’s largest displacement crisis, while Iranian emigration surged after the 2022 protests. Both diasporas include activists, donors and would-be leaders positioning for future rule. But passion does not equal unity, and visibility doesn’t equal representation. The loudest voices may reflect narrow slices of diverse communities. Authoritarian states insulate themselves while using emigration as a safety valve. Diasporas can aid democratic change, but those who remain will ultimately decide it. They can amplify struggles at home. They can’t replace them.

—THECONVERSATION.COM